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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Appellant John Bencivengo, former Mayor of 
Hamilton Township, New Jersey, was convicted of violating, 
inter alia, the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and § 2, and 
the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(1) and (3) and § 2, for 
accepting money from Marliese Ljuba in exchange for 
agreeing to influence members of the Hamilton Township 
School Board to refrain from putting the School District’s 
insurance contract up for competitive bidding.  For the 
 3 
 
reasons set forth below, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court.  
 
I.  Background 
 Bencivengo was elected Mayor of Hamilton 
Township, New Jersey in 2007.  Prior to his election, 
Bencivengo served on the Hamilton Township School Board 
and was a prominent Hamilton Township politician, serving 
as Chairman of the local Republican Party.  Bencivengo was 
reelected as Mayor in 2011.   
 
 Bencivengo was close friends with Marliese Ljuba, 
whom he had known since 2004.
1
  Ms. Ljuba was the 
insurance broker for the Hamilton Township School District.  
She personally earned between $600,000 and $700,000 in 
commissions from insurance contracts with the School 
District in 2011 alone.  In 2011, the School District’s 
insurance contracts were up for renewal.  One School Board 
member, Stephanie Pratico, urged the School Board to place 
the contract up for competitive bidding, rather than to simply 
renew the existing contract held by Ms. Ljuba’s firm.   
 In March of 2011, Bencivengo, who was facing 
financial difficulties, asked the Township’s Director of 
Community Planning and Compliance, Robert Warney, to 
approach Ms. Ljuba about providing him some financial 
assistance.  In May 2011, the two met, and ultimately Ms. 
                                              
1
 These facts are largely gleaned from the trial testimony of 
Ms. Ljuba and from the FBI’s recorded conversations 
between Bencivengo and Ms. Ljuba.  They are substantially 
uncontroverted by Mr. Bencivengo, who did not testify at 
trial.   
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Ljuba agreed to provide Bencivengo with $5,000.  There was 
some discussion of the money taking the form of a loan; 
however, Ms. Ljuba suggested that, instead, Bencivengo 
convince Ms. Pratico not to put the School Board’s insurance 
contract up for bid.  Ms. Ljuba believed that Bencivengo 
could influence Ms. Pratico because “[t]he [M]ayor is the 
head of the [R]epublican party in Hamilton Township.  He 
has a lot of political influence over anyone in a lower position 
in the township government.”  (Supp.  App. 103.)  
Bencivengo agreed to help Ms. Ljuba with Ms. Pratico.  
Worried about raising alarms at the bank with large cash 
withdrawals, Ms. Ljuba asked Bencivengo if she could write 
him a check instead of giving him cash.  Bencivengo did not 
want a check made out to him, so they agreed that Ms. 
Ljuba’s husband would write a check to Mr. Warney’s wife, 
and put in the memo line that the check was for a “cherry 
bedroom set.” 
 
 On June 29, 2011, Bencivengo approached Ms. Ljuba 
again, asking for her assistance in helping him pay his 
property taxes.  By this time, Ms. Ljuba was cooperating with 
the FBI and was recording her conversations with 
Bencivengo.  Ms. Ljuba again agreed to assist him, stating, 
“You help me with Pratico, you got anything because you 
know I am gonna need that down the road.”  (Supp. App. 
979.)  Ms. Ljuba meant that Bencivengo would “talk to [Ms. 
Pratico] and influence her not to direct the school district to 
go out to bid for the brokerage contract.”  (Supp. App. 138.)  
Bencivengo responded that he was “helping you as much as I 
can.”  (Supp. App. 138.)   
 
 On July 11, 2011, Ms. Ljuba and Bencivengo had 
lunch in Hamilton.  Ms. Ljuba told Bencivengo that she 
 5 
 
wanted to select the next person to fill a vacant seat on the 
School Board, and had a particular woman in mind—the 
sister of an insurance company representative who was a 
political unknown in Hamilton Township.  Bencivengo told 
Ms. Ljuba that he would approve the woman.  Ms. Ljuba 
testified that she needed his approval because, “in Hamilton it 
is practice that if you want a position on the school district 
and you’re a [R]epublican you would go to the [M]ayor and 
ask for his approval.”  (Supp. App. 142.)  The two also 
discussed Ms. Ljuba’s planned payment to Bencivengo. The 
two agreed that the money would be exchanged during their 
upcoming trip to Atlantic City, because they could make it 
seem as though Bencivengo had won the money gambling.    
 
 On July 28, 2011, Bencivengo met Ms. Ljuba in her 
hotel room in Atlantic City, and she gave him $5,000 in $100 
bills.  Bencivengo informed Ms. Ljuba that he had already 
talked to Ms. Pratico, and had urged Ms. Pratico that “you 
have to support those who support you,” reminding her that 
he had backed her when she wanted to run for School Board.  
(Supp. App. 159.)  Bencivengo also stated, “I’m gonna give 
[Pratico] a call and see if I can get rid of her off the school 
board, which would be huge, and get her in the [State] 
Assembly . . . .”  (Supp. App. 1005.)  Bencivengo meant that 
he intended to encourage Ms. Pratico to run for a seat in the 
State Assembly.  (Bencivengo Br. 17.)   
 It is undisputed that, as Mayor, Bencivengo had no 
statutory power or authority over the School Board.  He had 
no vote on the Board, nor any official role in choosing 
members of the School Board.   
 
 Bencivengo was charged with two counts of violating 
the Hobbs Act and two counts of violating the Travel Act, as 
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premised on the New Jersey bribery statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:27-
2.
2
  On October 12, 2012, approximately one month before 
trial began, the Government submitted its proposed jury 
instructions.  With respect to the Hobbs Act counts, the 
instructions stated, in relevant part, as follows: 
 
Extortion under color of official 
right means that a public official 
induced, obtained, accepted, or 
agreed to accept a payment to 
which he was not entitled, 
knowing that the payment 
accepted or to be accepted was 
made in return for taking, 
withholding or influencing official 
acts. . . . The Government is not 
required to prove that the public 
official actually possessed the 
official power to guarantee, deny, 
or influence any official actions.  
It is enough to show that [Ljuba] 
reasonably believed that the 
public official had the actual, 
residual, or anticipated official 
power to help [Ljuba] with 
respect to matters pending before 
a government agency.   
 
* * * 
                                              
2
 Bencivengo was also charged with money laundering in 
violation of 18 U.S.C § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and § 2, but has not 
appealed his conviction on that charge.   
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A public official commits 
extortion if he intentionally 
obtains, accepts, or agrees to 
accept money or other valuable 
benefit to which he was not 
entitled, knowing that the 
payment was made in return for 
taking, withholding, or 
influencing official action.  
Official action means any action 
by an official relating to their 
employment or function as a 
public servant, to include using 
one’s influence with other 
government officials, or 
expediting treatment of the 
payor’s business with 
government.   
 
Government’s Proposed Jury Instructions, Case 3:12-cr-
00429-AET (Doc. 20-1, at 19-22) (hereinafter, Gov. Proposed 
Jury Instructions) (emphasis added).  Bencivengo did not 
object to the Government’s proposed instructions; nor did he 
file his own proposed jury instructions.   
 
 At the close of the Government’s case, Bencivengo’s 
counsel moved for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 29, on the ground that “the United States has failed to 
provide sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury can 
conclude that Mr. Bencivengo accepted this money in 
exchange for an exercise of his official duties as Mayor of 
Hamilton Township.”  (Supp. App. 483.)  The Government 
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opposed the motion, arguing that “[i]t is enough to show that 
the payor reasonably believed that the public official had the 
actual, residual or anticipated official power to help the payor 
with respect to matters pending before a government agency.”  
(Supp. App. 484-85.)  The District Court denied 
Bencivengo’s motion, stating that: 
 
The fact that [Bencivengo] was 
the Mayor of Hamilton Township 
and not the school board president 
or chairman does not matter.  The 
astounding testimony that has 
been presented in this case of how 
the . . . interconnectedness 
between the officials of the 
township, the members of the 
school board, the schemes to 
place persons from office in 
Hamilton Township into the New 
Jersey State Assembly, all 
pointing to this pervasive 
influence and power actively 
exercised, it is surely a jury 
question as to whether the 
payments in this case were made 
to affect official conduct of the 
defendant. 
 
(Supp. App. 487-88) (emphasis added). 
 
 At the close of evidence, the District Court instructed 
the jury in accordance with the proposed jury instructions 
filed by the Government.  (Supp. App. 637-39.)  On 
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November 20, 2012, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on 
each count of the Indictment.   
 
 On appeal, Bencivengo argues that the District Court 
erred by failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal.  
With respect to his conviction under the Hobbs Act, he urges 
that the Government failed to identify any official act that 
was involved.  He argues that, as Mayor, he had no official 
authority over actions of the School Board, and therefore, had 
no actual power to replace Ms. Pratico or to otherwise ensure 
that Ms. Ljuba retained the insurance contract with the School 
District.  Bencivengo challenges his conviction under the 
Travel Act for similar reasons.  He states that, in agreeing to 
exercise his influence over members of the School Board, he 
was not “performing a governmental function,” as required by 
the New Jersey bribery statute that served as the predicate for 
his Travel Act conviction. 
 
 In addition, Bencivengo urges that his convictions 
under the Hobbs Act and Travel Act require proof of the same 
elements, and that, therefore, his conviction on both counts 
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  
Finally, he argues that the District Judge’s interruptions and 
criticism of defense counsel during the trial unduly prejudiced 
the jury against him, requiring reversal.   
 
 
 
II.  Discussion 
A.  Hobbs Act 
 1. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
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 We exercise plenary review over Bencivengo’s claim 
that the District Court erred in failing to grant his motion for 
judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act counts and apply the 
same standard as the District Court.  United States v. Brodie, 
403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005).  Accordingly, we “‘review 
the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to 
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the 
available evidence.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 294 
F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 
 The Hobbs Act makes it a crime to “obstruct . . . delay. 
. . or affect . . . commerce or the movement of any article or 
commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion.”  
“Extortion” is defined as “the obtaining of property from 
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual 
or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of 
official right.”  18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), (b)(2).  The 
Government urged that Bencivengo acted “under color of 
official right.”  On appeal, Bencivengo argues that his 
position as Mayor of Hamilton Township gave him no official 
power over the School Board and he should, therefore, have 
been acquitted, as he did not act “under color of official 
right.”  Similarly, he argues that Ms. Ljuba, a savvy operator 
well-versed in Hamilton Township politics, could not have 
reasonably believed he had the power to cause the School 
Board to decide against putting its insurance contract up for 
competitive bidding.  Accordingly, he argues, the 
Government has failed to establish that he acted “under color 
of official right.” 
 
 The Government contends that Bencivengo’s argument 
is foreclosed by our opinion in United States v. Mazzei, 521 
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F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
1014 (1975).  In that case, defendant Mazzei, a Pennsylvania 
state senator, used his influence to arrange for two state 
agencies to rent office space owned by property rental 
company BMI.  As a legislator, Mazzei had no actual power 
over the leasing of rental property by state agencies.  Mazzei 
informed a representative of BMI that “it was the practice on 
all state leases that a ten percent of the gross amount of the 
rentals would be paid to a senate finance re-election 
committee.”  Id. at 641.  BMI paid the money to Mazzei in 
cash.   
 
 On appeal, Mazzei argued that the payments made to 
him did not violate the Hobbs Act, as they merely represented 
BMI’s “voluntary purchase of his influence in an area in 
which he never pretended to have any official power.” Id. at 
643.  We rejected this argument, holding that, “in order to 
find that defendant acted ‘under color of official right,’ the 
jury need not have concluded that he had actual de jure power 
to secure grant of the lease as long as it found that [BMI] 
held, and defendant exploited, a reasonable belief that the 
state system so operated that the power in fact of defendant’s 
office included the effective authority to determine recipients 
of the state leases here involved.”  Id. (emphasis added).  We 
stated that the government had presented “sufficient evidence 
to justify a finding by the jury that [BMI] could reasonably 
have believed that as a concomitant of his official position 
defendant possessed not mere influence over state leases but 
in fact had effective power to determine to whom these leases 
were awarded even though his office gave him no such de 
jure power.”  Id. at 644 (emphasis added).   
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 Bencivengo argues that Mazzei is not controlling 
because our holding in that case turned on the issue of BMI’s 
reasonable belief that Mazzei had “effective power” to 
determine the outcome of the decision, and “not mere 
influence.”  Id.  He urges that, in the instant case, the 
Government does not contend that Ms. Ljuba believed 
Bencivengo to have “effective power” over the School 
Board’s decision regarding whether to put the insurance 
contract up for bid—indeed, Ms. Ljuba testified to that effect.  
Instead, the Government rests its case on Ms. Ljuba’s 
purchase of, and belief in, Bencivengo’s influence over the 
members of the School Board by virtue of his position as 
Mayor.
3
   
 
 While we find some merit in Bencivengo’s argument 
that our holding in Mazzei did not include situations where 
the victim of the extortion, here Ms. Ljuba, believed that the 
public official had only influence, and not “effective power” 
over the decision, that does not foreclose us from extending 
its reach.  We have not previously had occasion to determine 
whether the power to influence by virtue of one’s office 
                                              
3
 See, e.g., Gov. Br. 23 (“Here, the evidence allowed a 
rational jury to find that Bencivengo accepted payments from 
Ljuba in exchange for promising to use his influence as 
mayor to intervene with school board members . . . .”); id. at 
30 (“Here, there was ample evidence from which a rational 
jury could infer that Ljuba reasonably believed that 
Bencivengo had the authority to perform his end of the 
corrupt bargain, i.e., influencing school board members.”); id. 
at 31 (“what matters was the reasonable belief in 
Bencivengo’s official influence over school board members”) 
(emphasis in original).   
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satisfies the “under color of official right” requirement.  
However, other courts of appeals have explicitly held that the 
mere agreement to exercise influence is sufficient to sustain a 
conviction for extortion under the Hobbs Act.  For example, 
in United States v. Loftus, 992 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1993), a 
county commissioner was convicted of Hobbs Act extortion 
for accepting a bribe in exchange for agreeing to influence the 
city council’s decision to rezone a property for a shopping 
center development.  Though he was an official of the county, 
and not the city, Loftus told an undercover FBI informant that 
obtaining the votes for rezoning “would simply be a matter of 
swapping intergovernmental favors.”  Id. at 795.  On appeal, 
Loftus argued that he did not accept the money “under color 
of official right” because he lacked official authority over the 
zoning process, and because there was no evidence that the 
development’s sponsors believed that he could cause the 
property to be rezoned.  Id. at 796.  The Court of Appeals 
upheld Loftus’s conviction, stating that, “[a]ctual authority 
over the end result—rezoning—is not controlling if Loftus, 
through his official position, had influence and authority over 
a means to that end.”  See also United States v. D’Amico, 496 
F.3d 95, 102 (1st Cir. 2007) (“A reasonable jury thus could 
have concluded that D’Amico explicitly promised . . . that, in 
exchange for the $2,500 payment, he would use his influence 
as a city councilor to pressure the traffic department to pursue 
the road-widening project.  This conclusion is sufficient to 
ground a conviction.”); United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 
1116, 1128 (6th Cir. 1985); cf. United States v. Blackwood, 
768 F.2d 131, 135-36 (7th Cir. 1985) (sustaining a Hobbs Act 
conviction where “a jury could have found that Agent Ries 
reasonably believed that appellant had the power, through his 
official position and the connections and contacts it gave him 
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. . . , to influence the judicial decisions in the cases for which 
appellant received bribes.”).4 
 
 We agree with the reasoning of our sister courts of 
appeals.  There is no doubt that Bencivengo had no actual de 
jure or de facto power over the award of School Board 
insurance contracts; nor is there evidence that Ms. Ljuba 
believed he had such power.  However, the record is 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Bencivengo’s 
position as Mayor of Hamilton Township gave him influence 
over members of the School Board, and that Ms. Ljuba 
believed that he had such influence.  Accordingly, to the 
extent our decision in Mazzei does not reach the particular 
facts of this case, we now hold that where a public official 
has, and agrees to wield, influence over a governmental 
decision in exchange for financial gain, or where the official’s 
position could permit such influence, and the victim of an 
extortion scheme reasonably believes that the public official 
wields such influence, that is sufficient to sustain a conviction 
under the Hobbs Act, regardless of whether the official holds 
any de jure or de facto power over the decision.  Accordingly, 
                                              
4
 Other circuits have held similarly in the context of other 
federal bribery statutes.  See, e.g., United States v. Carson, 
464 F.2d 424, 433 (2d Cir. 1972) (conspiracy to travel in 
interstate commerce to defraud the United States in violation 
of 18 U.S.C.S. § 371) (“There is no doubt that federal bribery 
statutes have been construed to cover any situation in which 
the advice or recommendation of a Government employee 
would be influential, irrespective of the employee’s specific 
authority (or lack of same) to make a binding decision.”); 
United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (illegal 
gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.). 
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we reject Bencivengo’s argument that his lack of actual or 
“effective power” over the School Board is fatal to his 
conviction under the Hobbs Act.  Similarly, it is enough that 
Ljuba believed that Bencivengo’s position gave him 
influence, and not “effective power,” over the School Board’s 
decision with regard to the insurance contract.
5
   
 
 2.  Jury Instructions 
 Bencivengo’s argument is also foreclosed on another 
ground.  Specifically, he failed to object to the Government’s 
proposed jury instructions, which were filed well before trial 
commenced, and which were replete with statements 
indicating that a public official’s agreement to exercise 
influence over a governmental decision (or the victim’s 
reasonable belief in the official’s ability to exercise such 
influence) is sufficient to find a violation of the Hobbs Act.  
Bencivengo did not object to the proposed instructions at the 
time they were filed by the Government; nor did he object to 
                                              
5
 Bencivengo argues that the coercion element of Hobbs Act 
extortion cannot be satisfied where the purported victim of 
the extortion scheme (here, Ms. Ljuba) was not threatened or 
coerced in any way.  This argument is foreclosed by settled 
precedent.  See United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56, 65 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (“In essence, when proceeding under a ‘color of 
official right’ theory, the ‘misuse of a public office is said to 
supply the element of coercion.’”); Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 644 
(in a Hobbs Act prosecution based on an action under color of 
official right, “any element of coercion that may be required 
to establish extortion under the Hobbs Act is supplied by the 
misuse of the defendant’s official power.”).   
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them at the time they were read to the jury in a form 
substantially identical to what the Government had proposed.   
 
 Where a party fails to object to jury instructions, we 
review whether the instructions stated the correct legal 
standard for plain error.  United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 
321, 327 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013).  While, as noted above, we may 
not have confronted the precise situation presented in this 
case, other circuits have consistently held that an agreement 
by a public official to exercise influence over a governmental 
decision, or the victim’s reasonable belief in the official’s 
ability to exercise such influence, is sufficient to support a 
conviction under the Hobbs Act.  Indeed, the Government 
cited several of these cases in support of its proposed jury 
instructions.  See Gov. Proposed Jury Instructions, at 21 n.15 
(citing, inter alia, Loftus and Bibby).  As described supra, we 
believe the reasoning of these cases is sound, and indeed 
Bencivengo has failed to point to any contrary precedent.  
Accordingly, we cannot say that the District Court committed 
plain error in accepting the Government’s unopposed 
proposed jury instructions.   Moreover, when considered for 
sufficiency of the evidence, the record clearly supports the 
jury’s conviction on the instructions that were given to it. 
 
B.  Travel Act 
 Bencivengo also claims that the District Court erred by 
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the Travel 
Act charges because he was not “performing a governmental 
function” when accepting money from Ms. Ljuba in exchange 
for his agreement to exert his influence over the School 
Board.  We apply plenary review.  Brodie, 403 F.3d at 133. 
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 A Travel Act violation occurs when an individual 
“travels in interstate . . .  commerce or uses the mail or any 
facility in interstate . . . commerce, with intent to (1) 
distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or . . . (3) 
otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate 
the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of 
any unlawful activity . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(1), (3).  The 
Travel Act includes as an “unlawful activity”, “(2) extortion, 
bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which 
committed or of the United States . . . .”  Here, the 
Government bases its Travel Act charge on Bencivengo’s 
interstate telephone calls with Ms. Ljuba and his causing Ms. 
Ljuba to travel from her home in Delaware to New Jersey to 
violate the New Jersey Bribery in Official and Political 
Matters offense, which provides, in relevant part:  
 
A person is guilty of bribery if he 
. . . solicits, accepts or agrees to 
accept from another: 
 
a.  Any benefit as consideration 
for a decision, opinion, 
recommendation, vote or exercise 
of discretion of a public servant, 
party official or voter on any 
public issue or in any public 
election; or 
 
. . .  
 
c.  Any benefit as consideration 
for a violation of an official duty 
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of a public servant or party 
official . . . . 
 
It is no defense to prosecution 
under this section that a person 
whom the actor sought to 
influence was not qualified to act 
in the desired way whether 
because he had not yet assumed 
office, or lacked jurisdiction, or 
for any other reason. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27-2.  The statute defines a “public 
servant” as “any officer or employee of government, 
including legislators and judges, and any person participating 
as juror, advisor, consultant or otherwise, in performing a 
governmental function . . . .”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27-1(g). 
 
 Bencivengo’s claim that he cannot be convicted under 
the statute because he was not “performing a governmental 
function” in putting pressure on School Board members 
essentially amounts to a rehashing of his argument that he did 
not have any actual power over the award of School Board 
insurance contracts.
6
  The argument is even less compelling 
                                              
6
 The Government argues that the phrase “performing a 
governmental function” modifies the phrase “any person 
participating as a juror, advisor, consultant, or otherwise,” 
and does not limit the activities of “public servant[s]” or 
“officer[s] or employee[s] of government.”  See Gov. Br. 41.  
The Government is likely correct, and in any case, it is clear 
that Bencivengo was attempting to influence a “governmental 
function.”   
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here, where the state statute makes clear that the lack of 
actual jurisdiction over the decision is no defense to the 
crime.  See, e.g., State v. Schenkolewski, 693 A.2d 1173 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (“[I]t is sufficient if the recipient 
created the understanding with the briber that he could 
influence matters in connection with an official duty, whether 
or not he was capable of actually effecting such an action.”); 
State v. Sherwin, 317 A.2d 414, 422 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1974) (affirming conviction under predecessor bribery 
statute where Secretary of State had accepted a bribe from a 
contractor in return for urging the Secretary of Transportation 
to reject the lowest bid on a road project and to reopen 
bidding).
7
  Accordingly, we reject Bencivengo’s claim that 
his Travel Act conviction must be reversed because he was 
not “performing a governmental function” when accepting 
bribes from Ms. Ljuba.   
                                              
7
 Bencivengo relies on United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 
(3d Cir. 1976), where we reversed a Travel Act conviction 
based on the predecessor to the current New Jersey bribery 
statute, on the ground that the government had failed to show 
that the defendant had any actual or apparent influence over 
any official decisions regarding a commercial development 
project, or that the alleged bribers believed he had such 
influence.  In Dansker, unlike in the present case, it was 
unclear from the record whether the developers were even 
aware that the defendant held an official position.  Id. at 49-
50.  Here on the other hand, it is clear that Ms. Ljuba at least 
believed that Bencivengo had influence over the School 
Board, and there is no question that she knew Bencivengo 
was the Mayor.  Accordingly, Bencivengo’s reliance on 
Dansker is misplaced. 
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C.  Double Jeopardy 
 Bencivengo argues that his convictions for Hobbs Act 
extortion and Travel Act bribery are multiplicitous because 
they were based on essentially the same conduct on his part, 
and therefore violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  Because Bencivengo did not object on this 
basis in the proceedings below, we review for plain error.  
United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 60 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 
 “Where the same act or transaction constitutes a 
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be 
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only 
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which 
the other does not.”  Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 
299 (1932).  The Government correctly points out that the 
Travel Act requires the Government to prove that the 
defendant traveled (or caused someone to travel) in interstate 
commerce, or used the mail or any facility in interstate 
commerce, whereas a Hobbs Act violation occurs if the 
defendant “obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the 
movement of any article or commodity in commerce.”  The 
Hobbs Act does not require proof of interstate travel or the 
use of the mail or any other interstate facility, while the 
Travel Act does not require proof of extortion that affects 
interstate commerce.  Rather, by its terms, the Travel Act 
would theoretically apply if an individual travelled across 
state lines in order to commit a purely intrastate act of 
extortion or bribery.
8
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 It is true that some courts have found that a defendant’s act 
of crossing state lines to commit a crime is relevant to the 
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 Indeed, several courts of appeals, including our own, 
have upheld convictions under both the Hobbs Act and Travel 
Act based on the same conduct.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Somers, 496 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. 
Bornscheuer, 563 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Millet, 123 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Shields, 999 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Hollis, 725 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Walsh, 
700 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Billups, 692 
F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hathaway, 534 
F.2d 386, 397 (1st Cir. 1976).  And we are unaware of any 
cases in which a court has found that a defendant may not be 
prosecuted under both the Hobbs Act and Travel Act for the 
same conduct.  Accordingly, it cannot be said that the District 
Court’s failure to sua sponte raise and sustain a Double 
Jeopardy challenge to Bencivengo’s convictions under the 
Hobbs Act and Travel Act was plain error.   
 
 
 
D.  Conduct of the Trial Judge 
  Bencivengo maintains that the District Court denied 
him a fair trial by interrupting defense counsel’s cross-
                                                                                                     
Hobbs Act jurisdictional analysis.  However, these courts 
have typically been careful to note that such interstate travel 
does not, by itself, suffice to establish jurisdiction under the 
Hobbs Act, which still requires a de minimis effect on 
interstate commerce.  See, e.g., United States v. Le, 256 F.3d 
1229, 1237 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Kaplan, 171 
F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir. 1999).   
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examination of Ms. Ljuba, chastising him in the presence of 
the jury, and criticizing him for asking questions that, 
according to the District Judge, were compound or otherwise 
unclear.  We employ the plain error standard with respect to 
Bencivengo’s arguments regarding the conduct of the District 
Judge, as no objection was lodged at trial.  United States v. 
Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 1982).   
 
 The Supreme Court has described the high bar a 
litigant must meet to demonstrate that the conduct of the trial 
judge has prejudiced the trial against him.  In Liteky v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994), the Court stated that: 
 
[J]udicial remarks during the 
course of a trial that are critical or 
disapproving of, or even hostile 
to, counsel, the parties, or their 
cases, ordinarily do not support a 
bias or partiality challenge. They 
may do so if they reveal an 
opinion that derives from an 
extrajudicial source; and they will 
do so if they reveal such a high 
degree of favoritism or 
antagonism as to make fair 
judgment impossible. . . .  Not 
establishing bias or partiality, 
however, are expressions of 
impatience, dissatisfaction, 
annoyance,  and even anger, that 
are within the bounds of what 
imperfect men and women, even 
after having been confirmed as 
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federal judges, sometimes display. 
A judge’s ordinary efforts at 
courtroom administration—even a 
stern and short-tempered judge’s 
ordinary efforts at courtroom 
administration—remain immune. 
 
However high the bar, the judge may not assume an advocacy 
role or make it “‘clear to the jury that the court believes the 
accused is guilty.’”  United States v. Beaty, 722 F.2d 1090, 
1093 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Nobel, 696 F.2d 237); see also 
United States v. Wilensky, 757 F.2d 594, 598 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(“By assuming the roles of judge, attorney, and witness in the 
same proceeding the trial judge abandons the impartiality 
with which he is charged.”).  See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. 
Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976) (reversing where the trial 
judge conducted extensive examination of witnesses, 
commented on evidence and on the credibility of defense 
witnesses, and criticized the ability of plaintiff’s counsel); 
Lyle v. Renico, 470 F.3d 1177, 1180-81 (6th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972).    
 
 Examining the record as a whole, we cannot say that 
the District Judge’s actions were improper.  The District 
Judge did not conduct any examination of defense counsel or 
cross-examine any defense witnesses.  Nor did the District 
Judge lead Ms. Ljuba or express an opinion on any evidence 
presented by the defense.  The most that can be said is that 
the District Judge admonished defense counsel on several 
occasions to clarify questions that perhaps did not need to be 
clarified, as they were clearly understood by Ms. Ljuba.  See 
United States v. Hynes, 467 F.3d 951 (6th Cir. 2006) (no 
reversible error where the district judge, among other things, 
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“interrupted defense counsel to ask him to clarify his 
questions, to avoid an argumentative tone with a witness, 
[and] to proceed to a different topic because the one in 
question had been exhausted . . . .”).  In addition, the District 
Judge twice reminded the jury that it was not to draw any 
inference from her comments as to whether the Court held 
any opinion as to Bencivengo’s guilt.  (Supp. App. 615-16, 
629.)  See United States v. Ottaviano, 738 F.3d 586, 596 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (noting the relevance of curative instructions in 
determining whether the court’s remarks prejudiced the 
defendant); United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 723-24 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (finding no reversible error where “there [was] no 
suggestion . . . that the judge inappropriately participated in 
the questioning of witnesses” and where “the judge charged 
the jury that they were not to rely on their perception of his 
beliefs.”).  We conclude that the District Judge’s conduct did 
not constitute reversible error.
9
   
III.  Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court in all respects.    
                                              
9
 Moreover, even if a trial judge’s conduct is improper, it may 
still constitute harmless error where the evidence adduced at 
trial is so overwhelming that the trial judge’s behavior was 
immaterial to the jury’s conclusion.  See Ottaviano, 738 F.3d 
at 597-98; Wilensky, 757 F.2d at 598 (noting that the judge’s 
conduct was harmless when considered in light of the 
“overwhelming testimony” presented by the government).  
Here, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and indeed 
Bencivengo does not even dispute the key facts underlying 
his convictions.  
 
